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 Disposition Eff ect in Currency Trading:         
an Evidence from Experimental Student 
Games
 Hana DVORACKOVA1, Marek JOCHEC2, Tomas TICHY3
Abstract
The disposition eff ect has been described in the stock-investing context as a 
behavioral tendency of investors to hold on to losing stocks for too long and sell 
winning stocks too soon. In this paper it is examined whether the disposition eff ect 
can be confi rmed also in the experimental student game of currency trading data 
set. The presence of the disposition eff ect leads to the conclusion that students, 
despite using demo money, were trading with real behavioral bias and various 
interesting fi ndings concerning gender diff erences and size of the trade are 
discussed. The experimental data set was collected by Jochec during years 2009 
to 2015, students were trading under standardized rules. In this paper the holding 
periods of profi table and unprofi table trades were tested and compared. Based 
on these calculations the general presence of the disposition eff ect in the data set 
was confi rmed. Moreover it was confi rmed that males and females have diff erent 
tendency to succumb to this bias. 
Keywords: fi nancial behavior, currency trading, experimental fi nance, risk 
attitude, student game.
Introduction
The standard assumption of investment theory is that the markets are perfect 
and all agents act rationally. In reality, however, market frictions exist; it is neither 
easy nor costless to acquire information necessary to make eligible investment 
decisions and people often follow sentiments instead of sharp numbers.
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One of such consequences described in the stock-investing context is known 
as the disposition eff ect. As an implication of the Kahneman & Tversky´s (1979) 
prospect theory to investment, it is a behavioral tendency of investors to hold on 
losing stocks for too long (i.e., losing more and more) and sell winning stocks too 
soon (i.e., earning less than would be optimal). Accordingly, a person who has 
not made peace with his or her losses tend to accept gambles, which would not be 
otherwise acceptable. As argued by Odean (1998), the most obvious explanations 
– explanations based on informed trading, rebalancing, or transaction costs – fail 
to capture important features of the data. Analyzing records for 10,000 accounts at 
a large discount brokerage house proved the tendency of investors to hold losing 
investments too long and sell winning investments too soon. Notwithstanding, a 
fi rst paper labeling this behavioral eff ect as the disposition eff ect was published 
by Shefrin & Statman (1985), Pelster & Hofmann (2018).
Over time, various studies focused on the trader’s behavior and the disposition 
eff ects have been published. For example, Barberis and Xiong (2009) investigated 
whether prospect theory preferences can predict a disposition eff ect; Kaustia (2010) 
included a chapter focused on the disposition eff ect into the book Behavioral 
Finance: Investors, Corporations, and Markets. Moreover, Choe and Eom (2009) 
examined whether the disposition eff ect exists in the Korean stock index futures 
market. These authors also found strong evidence for the disposition eff ect and 
explained it in terms of investor characteristics. Besides that, Chen et al. (2007) 
studied the investment decision making in emerging markets. According to them 
Chinese investors, besides other, tend to sell stocks that have appreciated in 
price, but not those that have depreciated in price, which is consistent with the 
disposition eff ect, acknowledging gains but not losses. Similarly, also the results 
by Marciukaityte & Szewczyk (2012) are in accordance with the proposition 
that the disposition eff ect increases the supply of winning stocks and depresses 
their prices. On the contrary, Locke and Mann (2005) found no evidence of any 
contemporaneous measurable costs associated with the disposition eff ect.
The aim of our research is to show whether the disposition eff ect is present 
in the experimental student data sample, while it is supposed, that its presence 
supports the presumption that the students have the same, or at least similar biases, 
as real traders. Moreover, it is examined, whether any diff erences in the tendency 
to the disposition eff ect bias within gender and fi nally the relationship between 
the size of the trade and the disposition bias can be identifi ed. In particularly, we 
proceed as follows. The upcoming Section 2 reviews theoretical background, while 
in Section 3 the data set and the methodology are provided. Finally, in Section 4 
the results are discussed.
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Disposition eff ect and trading
There are two main approaches to fi nancial decision-making and asset pricing. 
First of all the traditional neoclassical fi nance, whose proponents treat sentiment 
as minor determinant of market prices and assume that investors are mostly free of 
biases in their decision-making, focusing on the fundamental risk or time varying 
risk aversion and seeking to maximize the expected utility, which is a rationality-
based framework. Contrary the behavioural approach accepts sentiment as the 
major determinant of market price and proponents are very critical to the expected 
utility as the main descriptive theory. They suggest that people usually do not 
behave exactly in accordance with expected utility theory, because their behaviour 
contains several psychological biases. One of the most important theories, taking 
into account the behavioural biases is the Prospect theory by Kaheman and Tversky 
(1979), which combined several insights due to Markowitz (1952) and Allais 
(1953). Within the Prospect theory, the disposition eff ect has been mentioned for 
the fi rst time.
The Prospect Theory
Prospect theory, designed by Kaheman and Tversky (1979) is the main 
theoretical descriptive framework describing actual choice patterns, while one 
of the main aims is to describe why people tend to make inferior choices. There 
are four main attributes, diff erentiating the prospect theory from the expected 
utility approach: (1) prospect theory suppose that the carriers of value are gains 
and losses relative to a reference point, contrary to the expected utility theory, 
which is based on the assumption that the carriers of value are fi nal wealth; (2) 
prospect theory postulates that tolerance for risk is diff erent, when it is concerning 
gains, than concerning losses, on the other hand, the expected utility theory see 
the people´s tolerance for risk as reasonably uniform; (3) prospect theory assumes 
that people do not weight probabilities correctly, they tend to overweight some 
probabilities and underweight others, while the expected utility theory assumes the 
correct perception of probabilities; (4) prospect theory assumes that the manner 
in which decision tasks are described or framed might infl uence the decision-
making procedure; contrary the expected utility theory see people as immune to 
these manners. 
The work of Kaheman and Tversky (1979) is based on a series of experiments, 
performed to identify the way in which people make decision (choices) under risk. 
These experiments were structured as binary choices, some of them are stated 
below.
First question leads to the explanation of the Common Ratio Eff ect, following 
Shefrin (2008: 393-394) we can assume the following example.
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Shefrin (2008) argues that, typically, most of the people choose 1A to 1B and 
almost everyone chooses 2B over 2A. The point is, however, that such decision 
is not in accordance with the expected utility theory. Let us suppose that a person 
has a utility function u(x), where x represents the outcome of the game. Without 
loss of generality, u(0) can be set at 0 and u(4000) can be set at 1. Write u(2000) 
for the utility attached to receiving $2000. Notice that in choosing 1A over 1B, 
an expected utility maximizing individual reveals that the expected utility such 
person attaches to 1A is greater than or equal to the expected utility he attaches 







Notwithstanding, in choosing 2B over 2A, an expected utility maximizing 
individual discloses that the expected utility he assigns to 2B is higher or equal 








1. Imagine that you have an opportunity to play one of two gambles described 
below. The gambles are denoted 1A and 1B. If you had to make a choice between 
the two, which would you choose, 1A or 1B?
1A: 90% chance of winning $2000, 10% chance of $0.
1B: 45% chance of winning $4000, 55% chance of $0.
2. Imagine that you have and opportunity to play one of two gambles 
described below. The gambles are denoted as 2A and 2B. If you had to make a 
choice between the two, which would you choose, 2A or 2B?
2A: $2000 with probability .002, $0 with probability .998
2B: $4000 with probability .001, $0 with probability .999
REALITIES IN A KALEIDOSCOPE
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Unless the individual is indiff erent, equations (2.3) and (2.6) cannot be applied 
at the same time. It follows that this way of choice cannot be consistent with the 
expected utility theory. If so, a person choosing 1A over 1B must choose also 2A 
over 2B. The point lies in the ratio of the probabilities attached to $4000 and $2000 
respectively in two decision exercises. Within choice 1, the ratio is 0.45/0.9=0.5, 
while in choice 2, the ratio is 0.001/0.002=0.5. The expected utility theory states 
that choice is constant to common ratios, however, in practice people often break 
this assumption, giving rise to what is called the common ratio eff ect. The reason 
leading to this eff ect is that choices 1 and 2 relate to the diff erent presentation 
of probabilities. Choice 2 features small probabilities, while choice 1 does not. 
It is supposed that the choice bias supposes that people tend to underweight the 
diff erence between a probability of 0.002 and 0.001, it seems to be irrelevant. 
Kaheman and Tversky (1979) described also the loss aversion, as is shown by 
the following example, adapted again from Shefrin (2008: 399-400):
3. Consider the following choice:
3A: a sure $0;
3B: a 50% chance to win $10, a 50% chance to lose $10.
Most people prefer 2B to 2A, which leads to assumption that people are risk 
averse in case of gains and risk seeking in case of losses, while losses appear 
larger than gains of the same height.
Another signifi cant eff ect described within the prospect theory is the isolation 
eff ect. Whereas the traditional approach assumes that framing is irrelevant to the 
decision-making, Kaheman and Tversky (1979) use it to indicate the manner in 
which a decision problem is illustrated. Thus, traditional approach shows that 
people will act as if they framed choices involving risk, but if people did so, and 
avoided making stochastically dominated choices, then their behaviour would be 
in accordance to the maximization of expected utility. 
The experimental conclusion, however, is that people are risk averse, when 
they are expecting gains, but in case of possible loss they become risk seeking, 
because they are isolating other variables than gain/loss information. However, 
when the choice is framed in context of gains, people make their decisions as 
if they are risk averse, on the other hand, when it is going about losses, people 
make their decisions as if they are risk seeking. This presumption forms the basis 
for formulating of the disposition eff ect, which has been described in the stock-
investing context as a behavioral tendency of investors to hold on losing stocks 
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for too long and sell winning stocks too soon. When investment value (stocks, 
CFDs etc.) grows, investors are getting more and more risk averse together with 
increasing gain. Contrary, when are value of investments falling, investors are 
willing to take more risk and hope that it will increase again soon. They usually 
do not take into account the possibility of increasing loss over time. 
Selected studies focused on the disposition eff ect
The prospect theory briefl y described in the section above provided the basis 
for a study made by Shefrin & Statman (1985) called The disposition to sell 
winners too early and ride losers too long: Theory and evidence, where the 
disposition eff ect was named and described. They also suggested that during 
December it is easier for investors to control their risk-seeking attitude in context 
of losses, because they pay far more attention to the tax reduction activities, than 
investments. 
This study was followed by many others, for example Odean (1998), who 
mentions self-control considering December but says little about regret. Fogel 
and Berry (2006) were also strongly supporting the importance of regret during 
explaining of the disposition eff ect, especially when it comes about losses. 
Lehenkari (2007), based on the Finnish data, provides evidence that investors 
are more prone to succumb to disposition eff ect for stocks they purchased than 
for stocks they received for free (as a gift, inheritance etc.). Barberis and Xiong 
(2009) investigated whether prospect theory preferences can predict a disposition 
eff ect; Kaustia (2010) included the chapter focused on the disposition eff ect into the 
book Behavioral Finance: Investors, Corporations, and Markets. In the Choe and 
Eom (2009) it was examined, whether the disposition eff ect exists in the Korean 
stock index futures market. 
Moreover, there are many studies focused on examination of the gender 
diff erences in the trading approach. For example, Jacobsen et al. (2014) compared 
the optimism of males and females in many fi elds including the economy and 
fi nancial markets. According to his research males tend to be signifi cantly more 
optimistic than women. Halko et al. (2012), Dwyer et al. (2002) and Barber and 
Odean (2000) confi rmed that females are more risk averse than males. Furthermore, 
Nicolosi et al. (2009) confi rmed that traders are able to learn and improve their 
trading skills based on experience.
Methodology
The dataset used in this study, was collected by Jochec (Dvořáčková and 
Jochec, 2018) during his lectures in various world countries over the last decade. 
Students were trading on the OANDA FX Trade Practice platform with currency 
pairs and CDFs. Initially, the students were given 100 000 USD and the trading 
REALITIES IN A KALEIDOSCOPE
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period was standardized for three months. Each student received unique account 
so that it was not possible to change the account later, reset the losses, use more 
accounts, etc. As those students did not trade with real money, they were motivated 
to achieve as good result as possible by a fi nancial reward and extra points for 
the exam for the winner (student with the highest account balance at the end of 
the trading period). One of the learning objectives was to experience fi rst-hand 
currency trading. At the end of the trading period students had to submit their 
trading history together with a short questionnaire and demographic information. 
Based on the collected information a unique dataset of experimental trading data 
linked to a unique account (an individual student trader) were created. Over the 
time, 292 students were involved in the game and they made 12 416 trades with the 
total volume of over three billion units in total. Among them, 43% (125 students) 
became profi t makers. That is to say that their account balance at the end of the 
trading period was higher than 100 000 USD. Regarding the gender diversity of 
traders, 120 females and 172 males were involved. Overall, there were 29% of 
trades made by females and 71% by males. The proportion of profi tmakers was 
slightly higher for females than males. 
The setting of the game in the currency markets is convenient; currency markets 
are liquid and close to effi  cient. It is diffi  cult to make meaningful price predictions 
and trading is more a matter of luck then skill. Thus, the skill component does 
not distort the picture and the trading patterns and strategies tend to be more 
behavioral in nature. 
The data generation and collection process proceeded as follows: The course 
was started with a series of lectures and assignments designed to explain the 
currency trading basics and the use of the trading platform. The game was launched 
sometime in the second to fourth week, and was running for the rest of the 
semester (60 to 90 days). Soon the focus shifted on the other topics and the game 
continued in the background. The rules and the interference with the students were 
minimal, students were not asked for any specifi c strategy, neither encouraged nor 
discouraged the use of fundamental or technical analysis; there was no “desired” 
amount, frequency, size, or currency of trades. The winner was the student with the 
highest trading account balance in the end. The ending profi t or loss did not aff ect 
the course grade except that the winner (and only the winner) earned few extra 
points towards the fi nal course grade and in some cases a voucher to a bookshop.
The experimental setting has obvious disadvantage that the money is not real 
and thus the joy of winning (pain of losing) is moderated. This should be slightly 
counteracted by awarding the winner. The counterargument might be that the 
“winner takes it all” reward scheme is problematic, there is no incentive for scoring 
second (third...); similarly, scoring low does not bear any penalty. This and the 
fact that it is hard to predict currency rates even for professional traders, means 
that those students were in eff ect encouraged taking higher-than-normal risk and 
engaged in “all or nothing” gamble. It was not possible to rule those problems out; 
however, there is no indication of more frequent occurrence of large bets on the last 
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few days of the game, which would pointing out a tendency towards pure gambling. 
It can be assumed that the students derived some benefi ts also from simply doing 
well, even if not the best. This could result from the long-term continuance of 
the experiment and the psychological benefi t (cost) of favourable (unfavourable) 
comparison with the peers, and, perhaps most importantly, by keeping the current 
winner and his/her balance at strict confi dentiality. This conjecture is supported 
by student comments and informal feedback. The assumption is, that in spite of 
the singular incentive, the students chose investment strategies without trying to 
“game the system” or engaging in an ultimate all-deciding gamble. The indirect 
evidence will be shown in subsequent chapters.
One can identify various advantages of the experimental setting; fi rstly, 
participants do not self-select into roles and thus the sample is less biased: take, 
for example, an eff ect of gender on trading decisions. To compare behavior of 
actual female and male traders is problematic because the female traders might 
have some male characteristics, which made them to select the trading profession 
and helped them to succeed in it (self-selection and survivorship bias). The sample 
of students/traders does not represent the population ideally, because all of them 
decided to study business, but not all of them would like to do the trading career. 
Second advantage of the experimental setting is the homogeneity of objectives. 
In real situation, someone might set up a currency position as a hedge for some 
other asset. For example, if somebody’s savings are predominantly in Euros but 
expected spending in dollars, that person might want to open a short position in 
EUR/USD in order to hedge the Euro exposure in the savings account. The loss 
on currency position off sets the gain on the savings account (and vice versa), 
thus decreasing the volatility of wealth. In case that the real traders behavior is 
analysed, their goals are not known, are they speculating or hedging? Diff erent 
objectives would lead to diff erent trading strategies. Moreover, in the real life, 
trader’s wealth is given by the sum of diff erent assets, therefore a loss in Oanda 
may be compensated by gain in another asset, and a high net asset value person 
may trade diff erently from a low net asset value person.
In spite of not being off ered monetary compensation, the data shows that students 
took the trading game seriously. It is supposed that it was partly caused by the fact, 
that students found the game interesting, as shown by the questionnaire result, 
75% of students answered that they traded because it was a course requirement 
and also interesting for them, 5% traded because it was purely interesting and 
20% of students traded only because it was a course requirement. According to 
another question, 44% of students actually had at least some feelings of addiction 
during the game. Figure 1 hereof shows answers to question from the questionnaire 
regarding the subjective feelings of addiction on trading. It is apparent that males 
tended to feel addiction to trading more often than females, which goes together 
with Tavares et al. (2001), telling the emergence of male’s addiction on games is 
much faster than females.
REALITIES IN A KALEIDOSCOPE
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Figure 1: Subjective Feelings of Addiction for Females (left) and Males (right)
Students were strongly self-motivated partly because they played the game 
while being introduced to the world of international fi nance as the course 
progressed (thus seeing its relevance and connection with the real world). The 
other part of their motivation could have been the peer pride. Students were 
often discussing their trading success and failures or boastfully showing others 
their impressive results on their Oanda-enabled smart phones. The fact that they 
competed with and benchmarked their results against their classmates and friends 
over an extended period possibly made the game more interesting (compared to 
some short laboratory experiment with strangers).
Results
Within this section we provide the key fi ndings. First, general presence of 
the disposition eff ect is examined and closely related questions are discussed; 
subsequently, the disposition eff ect is analyzed from gender perspective; fi nally, 
the relationship between the size of the trade and the disposition eff ect is studied.
Presence of the disposition eff ect within the data set
For the analysis purposes all actively closed trades with the absolute value of 
profi t/loss at least $1 have been used. For the individual traders’ analysis at least 
ten such trades throughout the entire game are required. Actively closed trade is 
a trade that was closed by the student action and not by the system (a trade may 
be closed automatically if a stop loss or take profi t order is attached to it). The 
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requirement of at least ten trade´s fi lters out less active students who might have 
not enjoyed the game and played it only formally, as it was a course requirement. 
Out of about 13,000 trades in the dataset, 5,300 (40%) used attached stop loss 
or take profi t orders, the remaining 7,700 (60%) were actively closed. Out of all 
trades, 1 500 had profi t/loss smaller than $1. Applying both fi lters simultaneously, 6 
500 trades were obtained. Out of almost 300 traders, 160 traders had both profi table 
and unprofi table trades and ten or more trades with profi t/loss at least $1. 
Average profi t on a trade is $850 (on average trade size $800K, or 0.1%), where 
average loss on unprofi table trades is $ 2,400 and average profi t on profi table trades 
is $2 450. Figure 2 shows histogram of profi t/loss for 6 543 actively closed trades 
with profi t/loss higher than $1. A relatively high positive average profi t is a result 
of applying two data fi lters; fi rstly, only actively closed trades (average Profi t/Loss 
on all trades with P/L larger than $1, closed actively or through take profi t and stop 
loss orders, is $650); secondly, system issued margin closeouts were excluded, 
which, if included, make average P/L per transaction negative $120 (there were 
520 trades closed in margin closeouts, with average P/L $ -18,000).
Margin closeout is the broker’s way to ensure that a client has suffi  cient funds 
to cover the losses (positive Net Asset Value) in case of adverse price trend. In 
the case of Oanda, the margin closeout is issued if the margin used by all open 
positions becomes higher than trader’s NAV multiplied by two. This happens 
when the unrealized P/L on open positions suffi  ciently deteriorates as a result of 
unfavorable move in exchange rate. When margin closeout happens, all positions 
are closed. This always results in a substantial aggregate realized loss, and such 
losses were excluded from the data set. The negative $120 average P/L is close 
to zero (.015% of the trade size), as expected in an uninformed zero-sum game. 
Slightly negative result is consistent with the presence of transaction costs. 
The fi rst question we are going to discuss is whether the disposition eff ect was 
observed overall. As already mentioned, the disposition eff ect has been confi rmed 
by many studies in the past (see, e.g., Barberis and Xiong, 2009; Choe and Eom, 
2009; Marciukaityte and Szewczyk, 2012). We show that our studies is not an 
exception. In Table 1, the number of trades, average holding period in days and 
timeLtoP (ratio of the average holding period of unprofi table trades to average 
holding period of profi table trades) for profi table/ unprofi table actively closed 
trades with profi t/loss $1 and higher are depicted. The reported p-values are for 
independent two-sample t-test for the diff erence in means, assuming unequal 
variance.
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Figure 2: Distribution of the P/L on a Trade
Figure 3: Profi t/Loss Function of the Holding Period
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Obviously, there is a disposition eff ect in all three specifi cations, resulting from 
the fact that the average holding period of unprofi table trades is signifi cantly longer 
than that of profi table trades. Looking at the basic mean, the average holding period 
for profi table trades is 3.4 days, whereas for unprofi table trades it is 5.5 days, 
which is higher by 62%. Concerning the mean, weighted by P/L, the diff erence 
is even more signifi cant. Traders in average held profi table trades 4.4 days, but 
unprofi table trades 10.5 days, which is 2.4 times longer holding period. According 
to this result, it is assumed that students took the trading seriously and they were 
afraid of big losses. The last category, average holding period weighted by the 
trade size also shows the presence of the disposition eff ect. The unprofi table trades 
holding period (1.9 days) is by 26% higher than for profi table trades (1.5 days).
Table 1: Holding Period of Trades
The next question, which should be answered here, is whether thetraders who 
have generated profi ts so far feel less pain from unprofi table trades, and thus 
close them faster. Impact of NAV at trade’s close on disposition eff ect is shown 
in Table 2. This table explores whether the decision to keep a particular trade 
open or to close it depends on whether the trader is overall at a profi t or loss at a 
moment of trade’s close.
Table 2: Holding Period of Trades according to the NAV
The answer to the question is yes, it seems so, albeit marginally. Holders of 
profi table accounts tend to keep their profi table trades in average for 3.5 days and 
their unprofi table trades for 5.4 days, while holders of unprofi table trades have 
shorted holding period of profi table trades, 3.2 days (they are probably more risk 







mean, weighted by 
trade size
profi table trades 4 400 3.4 4.4 1.5
unprofi table trades 2 100 5.5 10.5 1.9
all trades 6 500 4.1 6.2 1.6
p-value (mean diff erence) <.0001 <.0001 0.004
  meLtoP 1.6 2.4 1.3
Traders at overall profi t 
at the moment of trade’s 
close
Traders at overall loss at the 
moment of trade’s close
N Mean (days) N Mean (days)
Profi table trades 3 000 3.5 1 400 3.2
Unprofi table trades 900 5.4 1 200 5.6
  meLtoP 1.5 1.8
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trades, which is 5.6 days. The timeLtoP is 1.5 for holders of profi table accounts 
vs 1.8 for holders at overall loss, which is 20% higher. 
Disposition Eff ect and Gender
In this part the diff erence in the disposition eff ect bias with respect to the gender 
of trader is examined. Table 3 shows the length of trades for males and females and 
it is obvious that females tend to the disposition bias much more than males, they 
held loss trades more than two times longer than profi table trades. Contrary males 
held unprofi table trades only 1.3 times longer than those, which were profi table.
Table 3: Holding Period of Trades according to the gender
Following Figure 4 shows histograms of timeLtoP (ratio of the average holding 
period of unprofi table trades to average holding period of profi table trades) for 
males and females and it is again clear that the timeLtoP of females is much longer 
than of males. While most male students had the timeLtoP 1.0 and 2.0 days, the 
most females report the timeLtoP 3.3 days and 2.0 days.






Length of trade 
(days)
Avg. size
Profi t 3 200 2.5 $1M 1 200 5.8 $350K
Loss 1 600 3.2 $850K 600 12.3 $200K
  meLtoP 1.3 2.1
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Regarding the Table 3, the average size of the trades is reported as well so that 
signifi cant diff erence between diff erent gender scan be observed. The average 
size of profi table trades of males is 1M$, which is almost three times more than 
the average size of female´s profi table trades (350k$). The average size of loss 
trades of males and females is 850k$ and 200k$, respectively, which leads to the 
presumption that females are much more risk averse than males. As students had 
to fi ll in a questionnaire, which involved also one question regarding to the risk 
attitude, it is possible to compare their answers to the real numbers. 
Accordingly, males involved in the research tend to behave more risky than 
females. From the total number of respondents, 46% of females stated that they do 
not enjoy taking risk; the same answer gave only 26% of males. On the other hand, 
41% of females confi rmed enjoying taking risk, the same answered 60% of males. 
This result is consistent with the studies by Halko, Kaustia, & Alanko (2012), 
Dwyer, Gilkeson, & List (2002) and Barber & Odean (2000), who confi rmed that 
females are more risk averse than males. The subjective approach to the risk goes 
also together with the Jacobsen et al. (2014) and the optimistic approach of males. 
Note fi nally that looking at the results of the questionnaire and results of trading, 
they are in accordance, as it is obvious that males take much bigger trades and 
are less afraid of loss than females. 
Relationship between the size of the trade and the disposition eff ect
The last question discussed here is whether the disposition eff ect relates to the 
trade size. The initial presumption is that the biggest trade, the more signifi cant 
tendency for the disposition bias. Figure 5 shows a histogram of trade sizes, which 
is, for most trades between 1M$ and 2.05M$. Additional information about the 
holding periods of trades, divided into two groups (below average and above 
average) is reported in Table 4.
Figure 5: Histogram of Trade Sizes in USD
REALITIES IN A KALEIDOSCOPE
REVISTA DE CERCETARE SI INTERVENTIE SOCIALA - VOLUMUL 64/2019
260
Table 4: Holding Period of Trades with respect to the trade volume 
Disposition eff ect seems to disappear in trades with above average size (roughly 
upper quartile). Large trade sizes are usually used for minute-trading (small trades 
would result in insignifi cant results). If a trader plays on volatility and engages in 
minute trading, his/her trades will tend to be short in duration, both profi t-making 
and loss-making ones, actually unprofi table trades are in this case held for shorter 
time than profi table ones. The time to P for small trades is 1.6 days, whereas for 
large trades it is only 0.9 days. 
Conclusion
The disposition eff ect has been described in the stock-investing context as a 
behavioral tendency of investors to hold on to losing stocks for too long and sell 
winning stocks too soon. In this paper the disposition eff ect was confi rmed also 
in the experimental student game of currency trading data set. The presence of the 
disposition eff ect leads to the conclusion that students, despite using demo money, 
were trading with real behavioral bias. Moreover, interesting fi ndings concerning 
gender diff erences and size of the trade were discussed, providing relatively strong 
evidence on diff erences between females and males.
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